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The International Non-Profit Credit Rating Agency: The Viability of a 
Response 
Daniel Cash

 
 
The International Non-Profit Credit Rating Agency (INCRA) is an attempt to alter the 
way in which the economy approaches the rating of debt. By advancing a non-profit 
ideal, based upon long-term considerations, the agency hopes to penetrate an 
industry that has been widely recognised as being culpable in the creation of the 
Financial Crisis of 2008.Yet this project is in its infancy. This article is therefore an 
attempt to detail what the INCRA project is and what it hopes to do. Once these 
aspects have been established, the article offers a potential regulatory avenue that 
may assist the Bertelsmann Foundation with having its aim of establishing the INCRA 
project realised.  
 
In October 2014, it was reported that the International Non-Profit Credit Rating Agency 
(INCRA) project was, or at least would consider rating Turkey’s economy1. Although this 
may not appear to be out of the ordinary, given that the INCRA Project has produced 
unsolicited sovereign credit ratings for the United States of America, Brazil, France, 
Germany, Italy and Japan at the time of writing, this short article proposes that this turn of 
events compels one to determine the viability of the project at this stage of its development. 
                                                 

 Doctoral Candidate, Department of Law, Durham University (U.K.) Daniel.cash@durham.ac.uk. I would like 
to thank Annette Heuser, Executive Director of the Bertelsmann Foundation, and Anneliese Humpert, Project 
Manager at the Bertelsmann Foundation for their support and evaluations of earlier drafts. The usual 
responsibilities remain my own. 
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This issue is important because Turkey, rated Baa3 with a negative outlook by Moody’s 
Investor Services
2
 and BBB- by Fitch Ratings
3
 (both one notch higher than ‘speculative 
grade’), has been recognised as being on a collision course with ‘The Big Three’ credit rating 
agencies
4
. These sovereign ratings signify the agencies’ opinion regarding the Turkish 
government’s ability to fulfill its debt obligations to investors, rather than being an 
assessment on Turkey more generally. However, the insistence of Turkish President Mr. 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan that the Big Three’s approach constitutes nothing short of an 
ideological attack
5
 upon his country demonstrates the importance of evaluating the 
development of the INCRA project, given its new apparent association with such a 
complicated and charged situation. Given also that the exposure to capital markets is crucial 
for an emerging market, and that a rating agency is deemed fundamental to determining that 
exposure
6
, this issue is of pressing importance to the fortunes of the Turkish people, and any 
other market that comes into conflict with the ratings agencies.  
 
The article will therefore endeavor to assess a number of important issues regarding the 
INCRA Project and the Credit Rating Environment more generally. Firstly, it is important to 
understand what the INCRA project is, what it stands for and what it aims to do. This will be 
an extremely important exercise if we are to attempt to determine the prospect of success for 
the INCRA project. Finally, the article will attempt to hypothesize what conditions need to be 
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in place, of which four are proposed, for INCRA to become a viable alternative to the Big 
Three; Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch. 
 
The International Non-Profit Credit Rating Agency 
 
INCRA is a concept created and developed by the Bertelsmann Foundation (German: 
Bertelsmann Stiftung) since the end of 2011. Primarily, the concept builds upon analysis 
conducted by The Bertelsmann Foundation’s Transformation Index, which quantifies and 
compares a nation’s quality of governance from self-collected data7 and the Sustainable 
Governance Indicators project, which ‘examine[s] governance and policymaking in the 41 
OECD member states in order to evaluate each country’s need for an ability to carry out 
reform’8. It is this foundation of nation state research that has prompted the promotion of an 
ideal concerned with applying ‘forward looking indicators’9 to the credit rating of sovereign 
entities. 
 
The INCRA project argues that a more comprehensive set of indicators is required if a 
meaningful evaluation of a country’s long term socioeconomic and political situation, and 
thus the prospects of debt repayment, is to exist
10
. This, theoretically, would serve the 
purpose of promoting a better understanding of a country’s socioeconomic, institutional and 
                                                 
7
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8
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political infrastructure with the expressed hope that this would ‘better align them with the 
needs and expectations of investors’11.  
 
This then is a clear response to the multifaceted European Sovereign Debt Crisis
12
. It is also a 
response to the business model that has come to define the modern day elite Credit Rating 
Agency. The INCRA project attempts to transform this accepted business model by affirming 
that, for sovereign debt analysis at least, the task can be undertaken by considerably fewer, 
well incentivised people
13
. By increasing the remuneration packages afforded to its analysts, 
the INCRA project suggests that the opportunity for malpractice may be lessened somewhat, 
with the Non-Profit perspective hopefully ensuring the ‘transparency, accountability and 
quality of the ratings’14. 
 
However, there is one issue that is the central subject with regards to any business and that is 
cost. As the team at the Bertelsmann Foundation have taken a comprehensive approach to 
this ideal for an alternative rating agency, the inclusion of a thorough business plan makes for 
fascinating reading. To combat the conflict of interest that is seemingly at the center of most 
condemnations of the Big Three; the ‘Issuer-Pays’ model15, the Bertelsmann Foundation 
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propose that INCRA’s model be maintained through an endowment fund. The aim of the 
endowment fund, supported by governments, NGOs, foundations and private donors, is to 
make INCRA an independent and sustainable entity, thus removing the conflict of influence 
through payment
16
. To support this model, INCRA would envelop a Stakeholder council, 
whose primary function would be to separate the funders from the operational business
17
. To 
mitigate the influences of individual governments, it has also been proposed that 
supranational organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, or the EU contribute to the 
endowment fund rather than individual governments. 
 
With the projected initial financial requirement being $400 million, the Directors are correct 
in stating that whilst it may seem a considerable amount for a start-up Non-Profit 
organisation, it would be a relatively ‘small investment if divided among multiple funders. 
Put in perspective to the hundreds of billions of dollars already paid for public bailouts, that 
have been the result of faulty risk analysis, it is a relatively moderate and safe call’18. Also, in 
an attempt to promote transparency, the Bertelsmann Foundation has envisioned a four-way 
governance structure that includes the Funders, Management Body, Stakeholder Council and 
the Credit Policy Committee, which would be charged with ensuring the quality of the 
ratings. Such moves can be seen as a direct response to the opaque
19
 structures employed by 
the Big Three. Whilst there are some issues with the project, as will be discussed in the last 
section, the notion of instilling an alternative that is founded upon honorable and genuine 
principles should be commended at every stage of its development. 
                                                                                                                                                        
231; Ulrich G Schroeter ‘Credit Ratings and Credit Rating Agencies’ in Gerard Caprio (Ed) Handbook of Key 
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This notion of a direct response to the actions of the leading Credit Rating Agencies leads us 
to the next section of this analysis. Whilst we have witnessed in this section the response 
offered by the Bertelsmann Foundation, it is now imperative that we ask ‘what are they 
responding to?’ While the misgivings of the industry may be obvious to concerned onlookers, 
the actual mechanics of their culpability are complex and intertwined with a number of key 
socioeconomic and political factors. To make sense of these complexities, we will now 
endeavor to assess just some of the most criticised conflicts that have been promoted as 
‘inherent’ to the business model of the modern day Credit Rating Industry. 
 
The Inspiration for Organisational Responses 
 
The Bertelsmann Foundation’s promotion of the INCRA project does not stand alone in this 
post-crisis era. While the INCRA project is the focus of this article, the work of The National 
University of Singapore’s Risk Management Institute also contributes to this field of 
theoretical non-profit reactionary endeavors. The Credit Research Initiative
20
 (CRI), 
established in 2009, offers a daily and organic database of credit research across a number of 
continents for more than 60,000 listed firms
21
. This, together with INCRA, demonstrates the 
innovative response to the actions of the leadings CRAs surrounding the Financial Crisis. 
But, what were these actions that catapulted the Ratings Industry so forcibly into the public 
consciousness? While that question has a multitude of answers, this section will focus on the 
operational conflicts that have come to dominate the critique of the industry over recent 
decades. 
                                                 
20
 National University of Singapore, Risk Management Institute, Credit Research Initiative [2014]. 
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The issue of fee payment is inherently central to nearly every debate regarding the Credit 
Rating industry
22
. However, as we shall see in the next section, the specifics of the INCRA 
project do not combat this problem (although the philosophy may, in terms of highlighting 
the advantages of a non-profit system). The reason why the INCRA project cannot offer any 
specific alternative to the controversial ‘issuer-pays’ model is because the revenue streams 
for established CRAs that emanate from the rating of sovereign debt are remarkably low in 
comparison to corporate debt
23
 and the rating of structured products. In light of this fact, it is 
important to evaluate why the Foundation deems this endeavor so important before we move 
on.  
 
The Bertelsmann Foundation stresses that the recent European Sovereign-debt crisis ‘has 
made it obvious that (how to conduct and assess sovereign risk) needs to be addressed from 
two angles: 1) the legal set-up of a credit rating entity and; 2) the methodology it employs to 
rate sovereign debt’24. In concurrence, Gartner, Griesbach and Jung illustrate the dangers in 
not confronting this issue in the most direct way possible: 
 
It could even be cataclysmic if these sovereign debt ratings were driving government 
bond yields irrespective of the development of the underlying economic 
fundamentals. This would put the fate of entire nations into the hands of private 
                                                 
22
 For a general analysis of the ‘Issuer Pays’ model see Richard Cantor and Frank Packer ‘The Credit Rating 
Industry’ [1994] Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review 4; Herwig M Langohr and Patricia T 
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Current Regulatory Environment’ [2009] 59 Case Western Reserve Law Review 2; Panayotis Gavras 
‘Regulatory Abdication as Public Policy: Government Failure and the Real Conflicts of Interest of Credit Rating 
Agencies’ [2010] 10 Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 4; Giulia Rognoni Credit Rating Agencies: A 
Look Into Conflicts of Interest (Lambert Academic Publishing 2011). 
23
 See Moody’s 2013 Annual Report [2014].  
24
 Bertelsmann Stiftung (n 11). 
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agencies because bad ratings, which are not in line with economic fundamentals, 
could be justified ex post via self-fulfilling prophecies. Then, even innocent lambs 
could be turned into, and treated like, pigs
25
. 
 
This concept is particularly intriguing when we remember the current grievances that the 
Turkish government has with the leading rating agencies. The issue, or at least potential issue 
of rating agency involvement in national affairs, through their sovereign ratings, is not 
confined to the recent European Crisis and has been well analyzed for a number of years
26
. 
Hence, the Foundation’s understanding that sovereign ratings both affect the nation’s cost of 
borrowing and may also have a ‘mechanical, pro-cyclical’ effect due to regulatory 
provisions
27
 provides sufficient justification for the formulation of an INCRA-like response 
to the recent crisis. 
 
Although there proved to be limited contagion from the raft of downgrades given to a group 
of European nations
28
, the fact still remains that any erroneous sovereign ratings have the 
potential to cause widespread chaos. This is perhaps the primary reason for the formulation of 
the INCRA project. Furthermore, as Professor Frost affirms, there is very little evidence that 
has been published regarding the agencies’ methodological mechanisms, resulting in 
widespread frustration and confusion regarding the ‘mystery’ surrounding agency 
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methodological specifics
29
. This is further evidence of the need for some kind of alteration, as 
an increase in operational transparency would be of direct benefit to investors, nations, and 
issuers
30
.  
 
The Probability of Permeation 
 
The Bertelsmann Foundation has attempted to do something that is extraordinarily difficult in 
entering the credit rating industry and making a substantial contribution. An historical 
assessment dictates that entry into the ratings market is very unlikely to hold. A practical 
assessment reveals that the mechanisms of the industry actively deter new entrants to the 
market, and those that are successful in this quest are usually devoured by the leading 
participants soon after arrival. In addition, to do this under the guise of introducing a new 
ideal to the market further adds to the difficulties faced by the INCRA project. Yet, whilst 
pessimism in this sense is actually realism, there are factors that allude to the possibility of 
success for the INCRA project. Whilst an almost perfect scenario is required, whereby the 
majority of the factors that will discussed in this section must be realised, there is the 
potential for inclusion into the market place.  This section will determine what these key 
factors are. It will then offer a small number of suggestions that may further facilitate the 
successful establishment of the INCRA project. By doing so, it is hoped that some 
contribution can be made to the understanding of the INCRA project and crucially where it 
goes from this point on. 
                                                 
29
 Carol Ann Frost ‘Credit Rating Agencies in Capital Markets: A Review of Research Evidence on Selected 
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30
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What follows has to be considered in light of one fundamental understanding. As the 
Foundation explains: 
 
INCRA has the potential to become a cornerstone of a functional financial system of 
the future. What it needs now is the political will and support of visionary leaders 
around the world
31
. 
 
Without this political will the INCRA project will not succeed. However, the success of the 
project depends upon systemic support, not political will in the broadest sense. For example, 
the endowment of $400 million can be attained without the support of the G20, the IMF or 
the World Bank as intimated by the Foundation. As the INCRA system has been formulated 
to safeguard the integrity of the rating process, the financial backing can theoretically come 
from anywhere (to a certain extent), which increases the scope of potential investors. The 
point here though is that it is systemic support that is required, in terms of regulatory 
approval. Without the recognition and approval of the SEC, INCRA cannot become a factor 
in the ratings industry. 
 
The recognition from the SEC would at least allow INCRA to be accepted by investors as 
being potentially worthy of consideration. This recognition would come in the form of 
NRSRO designation. However, as we have seen, to move from acceptance to reliance 
involves a number of factors of which the recognition of the SEC is only one. But, it is 
fundamental; so this must be realised if INCRA is to be successful. Although there is a very 
                                                 
31
 Bertelsmann Stiftung (n 11) 38 (Emphasis added). 
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specific reason for this need other than admittance to the industry, which will be covered 
soon, it is important to note that should INCRA be recognised by the SEC, there would be a 
number of opportunities subsequently available to INCRA, with the direction that it would 
take being determined from that point. Yet, as was mentioned earlier, there are a number of 
issues that mean the recognition of the SEC, if it were to be a solitary event, would not be 
enough. So, if it were to be attained, INCRA would then have to develop ways with which it 
could increase its reputation in the eyes of investors. The sole way that INCRA could do this 
is by being extraordinarily accurate with its ratings, perhaps in conjunction with a clearly 
transparent approach to rating nations. Only this consistent and open approach will garner 
favor with investors who are systemically bound to the Big Three. 
 
Next, this ‘open approach’, and the factors that INCRA is exposing to scrutiny, needs 
protecting at all costs. What is meant by this is that were INCRA to be recognised, and were 
it to begin to establish itself in the marketplace, then its needs would exponentially grow. 
With its increased requirements would come an increased need for funding. An endowment 
of $400 million may sound a lot but it really is not relatively speaking. It is this situation that 
makes INCRA extraordinarily vulnerable to wealthy and powerful entities that may seek to 
gain influence over the agency, in return for financial support. It is therefore imperative that 
the central component of INCRA, its non-profit composition, be maintained. Though this 
sounds obvious for an agency entitled the International Non-Profit Credit Rating Agency, this 
situation would more than likely become reality were the agency to develop. 
 
In addition to this concept, INCRA must maintain its viewpoint that conflicts should be 
eliminated, not managed. The complete separation of analytical and commercial entities has 
12 
 
to be maintained to separate it from the leaders of the industry. It cannot incorporate 
additional business ventures to supplement its rating operations through increased revenues 
for the same reason. It is these elements, amongst an array of others, which must be adhered 
to if INCRA is to differentiate itself from the Big Three, and develop a meaningful bond with 
investors, as opposed to the seemingly forced bond between investors and the Big Three. 
 
These are just a small number of the issues facing INCRA in the immediate future. As the 
Foundation rightly acknowledge, there also needs to be change in the organizational behavior 
of investors; a change in the attitude displayed by governments; and a massive overhaul of 
the culture regarding the inclusion of the non-profit sector
32
. However, the Foundation 
appears intent on the notion that it is the G20 that can bring INCRA to life. Although the G20 
have the capability to assist in the funding of INCRA, one may doubt whether such a 
forward-thinking, non-profit credit rating agency is on the agenda for the largest countries in 
the world. Would it not make more sense for the largest countries to create a purely publicly-
funded and publicly-controlled credit rating agency instead? Some have suggested that this is 
precisely what is required to offset the ‘public good’ provision that is seemingly inherent 
within the provision of credit rating services by private parties
33
. 
 
It is therefore highly advised that the INCRA project seeks private sponsorship rather than 
governmental, in order to offset the obvious support for the ratings industry. We must not 
forget that the ratings industry did not become embedded on its own; the actions of the US 
Government directly created this situation, through regulatory measures. To subsequently 
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33
 Akos Rona-Tas and Stefanie Hiss ‘The Role of Ratings in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: The Art of 
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rely upon them (and their G20 counterparts) to enact change seems counterintuitive, although 
it is understood why the Foundation feels that its involvement could prove crucial (by way of 
its political and financial potential). 
 
Before concluding, the article will offer two differing visions for the future of the INCRA 
project. Both transform the nature of the INCRA project admittedly, but they potentially 
increase the probability of success of entering such a unique market. 
 
Firstly, it is suggested that INCRA merge with the CRI. By enveloping the firm-rating CRI 
with the sovereign-rating expertise of INCRA, the resulting entity would contain 
considerable, and more importantly ethical, credit rating knowledge. If the CRI could be 
extended to rate structured products in a similar manner, which could only be realised were 
the CRI to gain additional financial support (the like of which INCRA may have already 
garnered at that point), then the combined entity would be able to provide credit ratings for 
Nations, Firms, and structured products, which would bring it directly into competition with 
the Big Three. In doing so, the combined entity would promote the ideal of combining non-
profit and ethical methods of financial analysis. The global scale would change the nature of 
business in this sector, perhaps irreversibly.  
 
Though is it clear that this combination would consist of a large number of logistical issues, 
the synthesis would create something more significant than either of the systems could have 
imagined alone. The differences between the two systems are clear, and would provide a 
huge hurdle that would need to be overcome. However, there is a crucial attachment in that 
14 
 
they both desire to positively amend the credit rating industry (the actions and methodologies 
of the Big Three primarily). This unifying sentiment would be the foundation upon which the 
combined entity would be built. 
 
Secondly, if this new entity were to become a reality, there is a position for it other than 
competing for direct business with the Big Three, which of course would likely result in 
failure, owing to the numerous failed attempts from other agencies who have attempted to 
gain any substantial segment of the market share. If we consider that both the need to 
establish a reputation and championing the ideal of non-profit are key factors in the potential 
success of INCRA or CRI, then the perfect system would allow for both of these phenomena 
to be realised. 
This is where the ‘Rule 17g-5 Program’34 potentially makes the proposed combination of 
INCRA and CRI viable, in that it perhaps offers a fantastic opportunity to break the barriers 
set by the industry at present. In what seems like a perfectly-worded statement for the 
proposed INCRA/CRI entity, the SEC state that: 
 
Another potential benefit of the Rule 17g-5 Program is that it could possibly promote 
competition and mitigate barriers to entry naturally arising in the credit rating industry 
by allowing smaller NRSROs to compete for market share by developing a track 
record through the publication of unsolicited ratings
35
. 
 
                                                 
34
 Securities and Exchange Commission (n 59) 54. 
35
 Securities and Exchange Commission [2012] ‘Report to Congress on Assigned Credit Ratings’ 78. 
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The Rule 17g-5 Program is a system created under the Exchange Act
36
, that allows for an 
NRSRO that is not hired by the issuer of a structured product to obtain the same information 
the hired NRSRO receives in order to offer an unsolicited and tracked rating, with the aim of 
preventing the arranger of the structured product from selected NRSROs that can exclusively 
determine the ratings for that product
37
. Clearly then, this would be the perfect opportunity 
for the combined entity to demonstrate to investors the efficiency of the non-profit, forward 
thinking ideal. If the combined entity could develop methods, based on their current outlook, 
that would increase the accuracy of the ratings of structured products, which as we have seen 
already is rather low compared to corporate debt, then the reputation of the new agency 
would rise exponentially. 
 
The SEC even goes as far to state that the Rule 17g-5 Program would be ‘less burdensome 
and costly to implement than other alternatives’38. Additionally, the majority of the concerns 
of the SEC regarding the Rule 17g-5 Program revolve around incentivising NRSROs to 
engage in this system as the levels of compensation would be minimal at first instance, as the 
agency would be not be hired. This is obviously a problem for for-profit NRSROs but is 
clearly perfect for the combined entity proposed here. Therefore, there is a clear gap available 
for the proposed entity to fill. 
 
It is acknowledged that a proposal of this kind requires a lot more detail, and it is hoped that 
further research may be conducted on this issue to provide a solid foundation upon which a 
detailed proposal could be put forward. The proposal stems from a concern that an 
                                                 
36
 17 CFR 240. 17g-5 (a)(3) and (b)(9). 
37
 Securities and Exchange Commission (n 74) 54. 
38
 Securities and Exchange Commission (n 74) 78. 
16 
 
extraordinary opportunity to implement a cultural change within such a critical sector of the 
economy will be missed if one relies upon governments to implement the change. There is an 
abundance of evidence to show that, in places where change can be affected, there is no 
appetite to do so. Therefore, it is contested here that private individuals and organizations 
must be the ones who manipulate the marketplace in favor of ethics and sensible economics, 
rather than profit cultivation at any expense.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The INCRA project is at the stage now where its advancement thus far, and the potential of 
its future, needs to be assessed. This piece has aimed to establish what INCRA is and what it 
aims to do, contextualise its importance, and hypothesise its chances of success. Arguably, 
these aims have been achieved. However, what has been learnt is of importance to the 
INCRA project. In attempting to influence one of the most embedded and unique sectors of 
the financial landscape, the Bertelsmann Foundation has proposed to undertake a gargantuan 
task. The Foundation should be commended for a number of reasons. The despicable conduct 
of the Big Three in the lead-up to the financial crisis should have initiated an overwhelming 
amount of private action aimed at toppling the system they dominate. It didn’t. It provoked a 
wave of academic and political criticism, public anger and rumored reform. But, eight years 
on from the crisis it is clear to see that little has changed. The market share remains the same, 
the institutional protection remains intact, and unfortunately the brashness with which the Big 
Three conduct their business has been intensified rather than lessened. The Foundation has 
attempted real reform in the way of cultural alteration, which is extraordinarily 
commendable. Yet, this is not an economy that respects such endeavors.  
17 
 
 
This article referred to the economic situation in Turkey at the beginning to highlight the very 
public battle that INCRA may potentially enter. Such exposure can be very positive to a 
project like INCRA that is in its infancy. What would be the most interesting part of the 
INCRA rating of Turkey is the comparison with Moody’s and Fitch’s ratings, as INCRA 
advertises itself on taking longer-term socioeconomic factors in consideration. What any 
difference in rating that may occur means is another matter altogether. If INCRA were to be 
established and its ratings differed substantially from those of the Big Three, then questions 
would perhaps need to raised regarding the methodologies of the Big Three, and this in effect 
is the potentially important role projects such as INCRA and the CRI can play in the 
provision of credit ratings. 
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